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Book Review
The Role of Courts in American Society:
The Final Report of the Council on the
Role of Courts
By Jethro K. Lieberman (Principal Ed.). St. Paul, Minn.:
West Publishing Co., 1984. pp. xii, 171.
Reviewed by James D. Hopkinst
What are courts doing? What should courts be doing? How
can courts be strengthened to perform more efficiently in the
future?
These questions are primarily addressed by the Council on
the Role of Courts,1 in its report issued after five years of study
and a conference to which other experts in the field were invited
to examine and respond to the findings. This slim but provoca-
tive volume provides answers and recommendations, both philo-
sophical and pragmatic, to issues concerning the role of courts in
our society.
In the course of its inquiry, the Council had perforce to
treat matters of profound importance to any ordered community
- such as what function does a court discharge, and whether
other devices, either governmental or private, are better suited
to discharge that function. The report, though tersely written, is
far-ranging, spilling over into political, economic and sociological
areas from the purely legalistic implications of the nature of
courts and court systems.
Courts are intended to resolve disputes, and incidentally, as
t Columbia College, 1931; Columbia Law School, 1933; Justice, Appellate Division
2d Dep't, Supreme Court of New York, 1962-1981; Acting Dean, Pace University School
of Law, 1982-1983.
1. The Council consisted of a group of lawyers, scholars and judges, drawn together
by Daniel J. Meador upon the suggestion of Maurice Rosenberg.
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part of that process, to declare law. These are traditional and
accepted functions; what emerges from this report is that Ameri-
can courts, as well as making law, act as a kind of gyroscope to
maintain stability and confidence when the existing cultural or-
der is in flux.2 It comes as no surprise to learn what the available
statistics annexed to the report show: that the great bulk of liti-
gation arises out of the use of the automobile, and that family
and tort cases have grown in volume.3 The statistics reflect the
enormous changes in our society during the last sixty years,
changes from settled, family-oriented communities to a restless,
basically individual-oriented population. Nor does it come as a
surprise to find that courts are enlarging their role as decision-
makers to act as quasi-administrators in places beyond the ac-
customed judicial province. For various reasons, the legislative
and executive branches have either ignored, or delayed in deal-
ing with, the new problems created by the changes in society,
and the courts, because they cannot refuse jurisdiction of par-
ties, must confront the problems.
Litigation necessarily increases in an individualized setting;
the absorption by the family of the ills suffered by a member of
the family ceases, and the individual turns to the courts for re-
dress of these claims. There are, of course, other factors: the
spread of insurance, for example, and the development of the
class action (the banding together of individuals). In addition,
legislation has broadened the scope of rights and left their en-
forcement to the usual litigating channels. Courts are generally
looked to in order to satisfy a mounting appetite for social jus-
tice on a wide front. Thus, the court system relaxes the pressure
for violent governmental transformation.
The report indicates that the courts in the main have ac-
cepted their new role. Despite the flood of constantly increasing
cases which pour into the court system each year, the cases have
been in time disposed of, even though at a certain tension. What
is a valuable aspect of the report is an enlightened and imagina-
2. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN AMERICAN SocIETY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COUN-
CIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS 21-25 (J.K. Lieberman ed. 1984).
3. Id. at 168. Upon comparing the number of cases filed in 1961 to the number of
cases filed in 1982, the Council found that there had been a 254% increase in the num-
ber of civil cases filed within the court system, and other tort cases increased by 127%
from the years 1961 to 1982. Id.
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tive survey and appraisal of the various methods, developed and
developing, for both court-assisted and independent dispositions
of disputes such as arbitration, mediation, conciliation, judge-
renting, administrative processes, and even weaker forms, such
as consultation and negotiation.4 The advantages and disadvan-
tages of each are assayed, and tests are formulated by which a
judgment can be reached as to whether one or the other of the
various methods developed for alternate dispositions of disputes,
or the courts, are best equipped to confront the dispute.
Thus, it is suggested that both functional and prudential
criteria are serviceable to determine whether a type of case is
appropriate to be heard by courts. The functional criteria in-
clude the need for objectivity, the use of authoritative standards,
and the necessity to consider past as opposed to future events.5
The prudential criteria comprise costs, the need for individual-
ized treatment, the preference of the parties, the relative
strength of another institution, such as the family, to deal with
the problem, the necessity for immediate resolution, and the
ability to act indirectly.6 Through the use of these criteria it is
concluded that courts should hear cases involving constitutional
claims, criminal cases in which life or liberty is at issue, and dis-
putes between private parties based on legal entitlement, partic-
ularly where the dispute requires findings to be made of past
events. Conversely, it is said that courts should not hear cases
entailing claims for money in which the cost would be greater
than the damages sought, or cases where the legal issues are
well-settled and the determination would be repetitive.8
Moreover, the Council suggests that courts should be ready
to protectively assume control if litigants fail to resolve their
disputes by extra-judicial measures or to move initially to divert
cases to another channel, such as arbitration, and to devise al-
ternate procedures to solve disputes.' The courts should not,
however, consider cases arising out of policy decisions of govern-
mental agencies.
4. Id. at 94-100.
5. Id. at 102-08.
6. Id. at 108-12.
7. Id. at 112.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 113-14, 155.
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Finally, the report rehearses the view expressed by the tra-
ditionalist school that courts should not become intimately con-
cerned with the supervision or organization of state agencies,
such as prisons or hospitals. Additionally, the report adumbrates
the more liberal view of the adaptionist school that courts must
take action in such instances in order to render justice on behalf
of persons without effective representation in the political
forum.10
Examined critically, the criteria seem general and not
sharply defined in that murky area lying between constitutional
claims and claims constructively frivolous by reason either of the
pettiness of the damages or the established character of the gov-
erning rules. It is difficult to weigh the relative worth of cases
without weighing the subjective importance of the case to the
parties; sometimes the process takes as long as would hearing
the case. The populist notion that every person has the right to
be heard is hard to dislodge, and the common law tradition,
painfully created over centuries of discord, of the substitution of
peaceful decisions by courts for the blood feuds of the ancient
past has been subtly converted into the expansive process
wherein the courts, as a proven institution open to all, are in-
voked to hear disputes as trivial (and as poignant) as the class
action recently brought on behalf of a seven year old child in
California against the telephone company to recover the $.50 toll
charge for a call to Santa Claus.
Yet the attempt to formulate standards to screen the cases
worthy of judicial resolution from those more appropriate for
disposition by non-judicial conduits is commendable because it
brings to the surface and treats objectively the doubts and mis-
givings haunting many judges concerning the function of the
court system. Judges have been laboring for years to find ways
to meet the ever-rising case load. The invention of internal oper-
ating devices has been exhausted; thus, it is time to consider ju-
risdictional controls. The Council's report serves to alert the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches to the deeper problems
underlying the courts' dilemma and it possesses the mark of au-
thoritativeness which should move the two other branches to
act.
10. Id. at 117-21.
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There are self-imposed limits in the report. The kinds of
cases which should be heard by the federal courts as distin-
guished from the state courts are not broached, though the im-
portance of the question is noted." That, I hope, will be the sub-
ject of another study, for as Congress enacts legislation to
enhance the jurisdiction of the federal courts, duplication of the
functions of the state courts inevitably arises.
The report mentions, but does not emphasize, the norma-
tive function which courts perform - the judgment of fault. 2
This is an attribute which litigants in many instances seek to
invoke, sometimes for personal vindication, sometimes to obtain
formal condemnation of an adversary. No other forum quite
takes the place of the court in meeting this need. However,
whether this emphasis on fault is a cultural disadvantage re-
mains a subject of further study - vide the avoidance in Japan of
determining fault in favor of the conciliation of disputes.
The section of the report discussing means to strengthen
the capacity of courts to give full attention and consideration to
their mounting case load reaches no novel conclusions. The ar-
guments for and against specialized courts are summarized with-
out recommendation, apparently because conditions dictate
whether specialized courts may be valuable. 3 Similar treatment
is afforded to the use of specialized judges, including the "rented
judge" sanctioned in California." The expansion of the use of
court-appointed adjuncts - referees, receivers, mediators - is sug-
gested, but the report concludes that greater study of a perma-
nent body of professional aides is necessary before endorsing its
creation.' 5 Procedural innovations stressing the role of courts in
managing the flow of cases at the threshold by screening to de-
termine whether alternate methods of resolution are suitable are
also described.'6 It is recognized by the authors that these inno-
vations, as well as improved physical resources, such as video-
tape and a library of approved social and technical material, call
11. Id. at 45-47.
12. Id. at 72-76.
13. Id. at 136-40.
14. Id. at 141-43.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 143-47.
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for increased fiscal support.17 Again, the need for sympathetic
executive and legislative intercession is evident.
The bibliography assembled by the report is impressive. Ob-
viously, the literature in the field has been carefully canvassed;
no suggestion for improvement in dealing with the business of
the courts has escaped the collective eye of the Council.
Though the report does not, and probably cannot, give a de-
finitive answer to all the questions it addresses, it is no small
achievement to put the problems which the questions entail in
clear perspective. It is of equal importance that the report ac-
knowledges the central role of the courts as the controlling force
within the group of dispute-resolving agencies. How that role is
to be perceived and carried out in the future is the question that
our society cannot avoid. The Council's report is an illuminating
contribution towards the appreciation of the depth of the ques-
tion and its ultimate solution.
17. Id. at 147-48.
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